This is the first MIP on BSC. A MIP is a “MOR Improvement Proposal”, all suggestions for the next executive proposal are put in place in a MIP, discussed in the forum and the final result of it is the executive proposal that goes live on-chain for GRO holders to vote on through the Governance Page.

# Purpose of the proposal

- Get MOR closer to its $ peg
- Disincentivize borrowing with stablecoin collaterals
- Incentivize borrowing with volatile collaterals

# Changes Proposed

Ilk type: STKAPEMORBUSD-ACurrent Parameters:

Stability Fee: 15%

Liquidation Ratio: 102%

Chop: 1.5%

Proposed Parameters:

Stability Fee: 25%

Liquidation Ratio: 110%

Chop: 9%

Ilk type: STKPCSBUSDUSDC-A

Current Parameters:

Stability Fee: 5%

Debt Ceiling: 10,000,000

Proposed Parameters:

Stability Fee: 50%

Debt Ceiling: 0

By lowering the debt ceiling to 0 and increasing the stability fee this collateral type would be discontinued once all borrowers have closed down their positions.

Ilk type: STKCAKE-A

Current Parameters:

Liquidation Ratio: 175%

Proposed Parameters:

Liquidation Ratio: 150%

Ilk type: STKBANANA-A

Current Parameters:

Liquidation Ratio: 175%

Proposed Parameters:

Liquidation Ratio: 150%

Ilk type: STKPCSBNBCAKE-A

Current Parameters:

Liquidation Ratio: 175%

Proposed Parameters:

Liquidation Ratio: 150%

Ilk type: STKPCSBNBETH-A

Current Parameters:

Liquidation Ratio: 175%

Proposed Parameters:

Liquidation Ratio: 150%

Ilk type: STKPCSBNBBTCB-A

Current Parameters:

Liquidation Ratio: 175%

Proposed Parameters:

Liquidation Ratio: 150%

Ilk type: STKPCSETHBTCB-A

Current Parameters:

Liquidation Ratio: 175%

Proposed Parameters:

Liquidation Ratio: 150%

Withdraw 50,000 MOR from system surplus to start WHEAT/MOR and GRO/MOR liquidity on BSC (and test revenue share).

The other proposal is to increase the performance fee going to WHEAT EBCs from 5% to 10%, this will double WHEAT’s revenues from MOR and the yield difference for users is barely noticeable. In exchange for doing so the liquidation ratios for the volatile pairs would be lowered from 175% to 150% allowing users to borrow more MOR with their collateral.

Now is the time for the community to discuss before it is proposed on-chain, do you agree with this proposed changes or think it is a bad idea? Post your thoughts in the comments and let’s get the conversation going. It is our job as members of the GRO DAO to balance the peg strength of MOR, the security of the protocol and the profitability for GRO holders.

Edit 1 (11/22/2021):

-Proposed Stability Fee of STKAPEMORBUSD-A changed from 45% to 25%.

-Proposed Stability Fee of STKPCSBUSDUSDC-A changed from 45% to 50%.

-Added withdrawing 50k MOR from system surplus.